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ARTICLES 
AN ESSAY ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LANGUAGE 
Frederick Schauer* 
Many contemporary constitutional scholars have explored 
the extent to which, if at all, judges should go "outside of' or "be-
yond" the constitutional text for decisional principles in constitu-
tional cases. 1 Although the resulting discussions have been highly 
illuminating, I do not wish to deal directly with this controversy 
here. Rather, I propose to discuss what is logically a prior ques-
tion. For before we can argue intelligently about whether to go 
outside of the text, we ought to explore the meaning of the words 
inside the text. Only then will we know what counts as going 
"outside," and until then, it is not clear that there even is an 
outside because "inside" and "outside" are relative terms. 
• Cutler Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. A.B., 1967, M.B.A., 
1968, Danmouth; J.D., 1972, Harvard. 
The research and writing of this essay were supponed by a grant from the Na-
tional Endowment for the Humanities. 1 am also indebted to Philip Devine, Kent 
Greenawalt, Margit Livingston, Mary Jane Morrison, Stanley Paulson, Manin Wil-
lard, and William Van Alstyne for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1. The contemporary jargon draws a distinction between ·~interpretivism" and 
"noninterpretivism," but this is merely one characterization of an issue that predates 
the current labels. See generally J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSTRUST 1-14 (1980); 
.Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 
(1980); Grey, /)o We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Grey, Unwritten Constitution]; Grey, Origins of the Unwritten 
Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 
843 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Grey, Origins); Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist 
Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972); Monaghan, Of"Liberty" and "Property," 62 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 405 (1977); Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 117 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Monaghan, The Constitution]; 
Perry, Substantive Oue Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 
71 Nw. U.L. REV. 417 (1976); Richards, Human Rights as the Unwrillen Constitution: 
The Problem of Change and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 U. DAYTON L. 
REv. 295 (1979); Constitutional Adjudication and J)emocratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 259 (1981); Judicial Review versus Oemocracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981). 
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We assume, perhaps too easily, that the language of the Con-
stitution is neither the source of, nor the answer to, our problems, 
and we then head off into the forbidding jungles of history, polit-
ical theory, moral philosophy, public policy, and what have you 
without any clear guide. An examination of the words in the Con-
stitution has been merely the hors d'oeuvre, with high theory as 
the main course. 
There is nothing unseemly about high theory in this sense. 
Nevertheless, we need to look at the words of the Constitution as 
language, and we need to examine closely some of our rarely 
questioned presuppositions about constitutional language. Al-
though this examination logically is prior to any broader interpre-
tation of the Constitution, it has received surprisingly little 
concentrated attention in the literature. 2 
Constitutional cogniscenti talk about "gaps," "great silences," 
"vague language," and "open texture" as if these were concepts of 
little controversy.3 But what makes the requirement that the Pres-
ident be of "the Age of thirty five Years" specific and the require-
ment of "equal protection of the laws" vague? Why are there 
"loopholes" in the Internal Revenue Code, but not in the Consti-
tution? In order to understand and to attempt to answer questions 
like these, we need a theory of constitutional language as much as 
we need theories of constitutional law. 
The Constitution is, after all, a writing,4 and at bottom we are 
2. One notable exception is Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What 
it Always Meant?, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977). See also Alexander, Modern 
Equal Protection Tlteories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 3, 4-16 (1981); Smith, Rights, Right Answers, and the Constructive Model of Moral-
ity, 5 Soc. THEORY AND PRAC. 409, 421-25 (1980). Philosophy is at the moment hav-
ing a_.good run in the constitutional arena, but, with few exceptions, it is moral 
philosophy rather than the philosophy of language that is taken to be the most useful 
for constitional inquiries. Given that we have a wrilten constitution, this lack of at-
tention from the perspective of the philosophy of language seems a bit surprising. 
Although not directed specifically towards constitutional interpretation, there has 
been some recent attention to legal language from a philosophical perspective. 
Moore, Tire Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151 (1981); Stone, From aLan-
guage Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149 (1981). 
3. In addition to the works cited supra note 1, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW at iii (1978) ("[T]he Constitution is an intentionally incomplete, often 
deliberately indeterminate structure for the participatory evolution of political ideals 
and governmental practices."); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Supp. 
1979) ("open-textured" provisions such as "equal protection" and "due process"; use 
of "broad terminology" in the Constitution). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
242 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("large gaps in the Constitution"); H.P. Hood & 
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949) (Jackson, J.) ("great silences of the 
Constitution"); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 413 (1946) ("great con-
stitutional gaps"). 
4. Although it illustrates the focus both of this inquiry and of my conclusions, 
the phrase in the text is, at this stage, question-begging. For even if we note that the 
Constitution is written, what does this say about the constitution? This question can 
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interpreting the words of a written document. But how do we do 
this? What does it mean to "interpret" a constitutional provision? 
What do we mean when we say that a constitutional provision 
"means" something? How do we start such an analysis? These 
are hard and important questions, and we should not dismiss 
them as irrelevant philosophical speculation. Indeed, answers to 
these questions underlie any theory of constitutional adjudication, 
and this Essay attempts to bring some of these answers to the sur-
face for closer inspection. 
My intention here is not to offer a completely mature theory 
of constitutional language. Rather, I wish to explore the way in 
which the conventions of language affect constitutional theory. At 
the end of t~s Essay, I conclude that constitutional language acts 
as a significant restraint on constitutional decision, but I will not 
have developed a complete theory of constitutional language 
which directs any particular substantive outcomes. A complete 
theory will have to wait for another time. 
I. ON THE SUPPOSED UNIQUENESS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE 
In his pioneering work on legal language, H.L.A. Hart argued 
that legal language is fundamentally different from ordinary lan-
guage.5 According to Hart, if one fails to recognize the unique 
context and the distinct presuppositions of legal discourse, then 
one commits the errors of formalism or conceptualism-giving to 
words in the abstract an aura of authority and of unique reference 
inconsistent with the view of language as an activity determined 
and governed by social rules.6 If, as Hart and his philosophical 
be expressed in terms of how much of the constitution is contained or captured in the 
(written) Constitution. It is this question that this essay is intended to address. Posit-
ing the question in this way suggests the Continental distinction between a material 
constitution and a formal constitution. See H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 
222-24 (M. Knight trans. 2d ed. 1967). 
5. Hart's original foray into the field was The Ascription of Responsibility and 
Rights, in Lome AND LANGUAGE (First Series) 145-66 (A. Flew ed. 1955). Hart's 
later repudiation of this strictly performative view of legal language (H.L.A. HART, 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY V (1968)) was the result of the more complex, pre-
supposition-oriented theory first put forth in Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurispru-
dence, 70 LAW Q. REv. 37 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Hart, Definition and Theory], 
and embellished in H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAW 13-17 (1961). See also Co-
hen, Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence, 29 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc. (SUPP.) 213 
(1955); Hart, Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence, 29 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc. 
(SUPP.) 239 (1955). See generally N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART (1981); Hacker, 
Hart's Philosophy of Law, and Baker, Defeasibility and Meaning, in LAW, MoRALITY, 
AND SociETY: EsSAYS IN HoNOUR OF H.L.A. HART I, 26 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 
1977). 
6. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 126-27; Sartorius, Hart's Concept of Law, 
in MORE ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 131-61 (R. Summers ed. 1971). See also G. 
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contemporaries supposed, meaning is use, 7 then legal use ought to 
produce different meanings than a physicist's use, a sociologist's 
use, or the use of the man on the Clapham omnibus.8 And, just as 
legal language is different in kind from ordinary language, consti-
tutional language may be different from other legallanguage.9 In 
fact, this hypothesis implicitly undergirds many different theories 
of constitutional interpretation. 10 The various theories of a "liv-
ing" or "changeable" constitution each presuppose a view of the 
uniqueness of constitutional language, setting it off from the lin-
guistic raw material with which lawyers normally deal. 11 
GoTTLIEB, THE LOGIC OF CHOICE 48 (1968); Hart, Problems o.f Philosophy o.f Law, in 
6 ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 266, 270 (P. Edwards ed. 1967); Stone, Ratiocination Not Ra-
tionalisation, 74 MIND 463 (1965). 
7. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS§§ 30, 43, 120, 138, 
340, 532 (G. Anscombe trans. 1958). Although Wittgenstein was the guiding light of 
the "meaning is use" approach, that approach was in fact the standard under which 
most of Anglo-American philosophy operated in the 1950s and 1960s. See, e.g., J. 
AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & M. Sbisa 2d ed. 1975) 
[hereinafter cited as J. AUSTIN, WORDs); J. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES (3d ed. 
1979); Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL. REv. 377 (1957); Strawson, Propositions, Concepts, 
and Logical Truth, 7 PHIL. Q. 15 (1957). 
8. The man on the Clapham omnibus is most frequently taken to be the proto-
typical reasonable man for purposes of tort law, see, e.g., Bolam v. Friem Hospital 
Management Committee, I W.L.R. 582, 586-87 (Q.B. 1957), but he is also the ordi-
nary speaker of ordinary English. See, e.g., Woodhouse A.C. Israel Cocoa Ltd. S.A. 
v. Nigerian Produce Marketing Co., 2 Q.B. 23, 63 (C.A. 1971). Although we need not 
recount Hart's arguments, those arguments do suggest that constitutional language 
may possess a uniqueness of its own. For summary and critique, see N. MAC-
CORMICK, supra note 5; Baker, supra note 5; Hacker, supra note 5. See also Shuman, 
Jurisprudence and the Analysis o.f Fundamental Legal Terms, 8 J. LEGAL EDuc. 437 
(1956). 
9. "[l]t was by no means self-evident in 1789 that judges should use the same 
techniques in the construction of constitutional provisions as in the interpretation of 
ordinary statutory and decisional sources." H. Jones, The Common Law in the l/nited 
States: English Themes and American Variations, in POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LE-
GAL CONTINUITY 134 (1976). See also Bridwell, Book Review, 1978 DUKE L.J. 907, 
914-15 (reviewing R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977)). 
10. Thus, when John Marshall observed that "we must never forget that it is a 
constitution we are expounding," McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
407 (1819), he was adopting the thesis discussed in the text, although McCulloch is 
significantly obscure in that Marshall did not explain in what way constitutional in-
terpretation was unique. See Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 
HARV. L. REv. 217 (1955). For a sampling of the various theories that embody this 
view in one way or other, see C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW (1969); C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 
(1969); Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. I (1934); 
Murphy,· The Art o.f Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Showing, in EsSAYS 
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 130 (M. Harmon ed. 1978). 
II. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1980); H. Mc-
BAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (1927); Brest, supra note I; Grey, supra note I; 
Munzer & Nickel, supra note 2; Perry, supra note I; Miller, Notes on the Concept o.fthe 
"Living" Constitution, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 881 (1963); Reich, The Living. Constitu-
tion and the Court's Role, in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT 133 (S. Strick-
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There seem to be readily apparent differences between consti-
tutional language and other legal language. Grandiloquent 
phrases like "freedom of speech," "equal protection of the laws," 
"due process of law," and "privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the United States" have few counterparts in the Internal Reve-
nue Code or the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. 
Indeed, many constitutional provisions are more than merely in-
determinate. They have a powerful emotive component. The 
Constitution is more an eloquently written manifesto12 than it is a 
code, and in many ways we are much better for that. But the elo-
quence and emotive force of the document further reinforce the 
view that the Constitution's words are as different as they are spe-
cial. To construe its language too literally or too much like the 
language in a conventional statute would be both unrealistic and· 
inconsistent with its deeper purposes. In some ways, the Constitu-
tion is a metaphor.t3 
Not unrelated to the Constitution's metaphorical quality is its 
permanence. Statutes are frequently amended, and the common 
law is continually changing, but the Constitution has a special sort 
of durability. Not only is amending the Constitution extremely 
difficult, but we also seem remarkably averse to doing so. 14 Many 
.limd ed. 1967); Richards, supra note I. Contra Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living 
Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1976). In terms of a theory of meaning, some of 
the foregoing theses could be said to assume that the meaning of constitutional provi-
sions changes over time, while others would hold that the meaning remains the same 
while the applications change. Exploring that distinction at this point would serve 
little purpose, because it and related issues are the focus of the balance of this Essay. 
12. In this sense, the Constitution combines both argument and aspiration with a 
statement of existing principles, not unlike Joel Feinberg's "manifesto sense" of a 
right. J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 67 (1973). I derive some support for this 
view from the similarity between the largely enforceable American Constitution and 
the many largely unenforceable international treaties, declarations, and conventions 
dealing with human rights. Learned Hand, of course, treated this manifesto sense as 
virtually the sole function of some constitutional provisions. L. HAND, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 33-34 (1958). 
13. One of the purposes of a metaphor is to get us to think in different ways, to 
block intentionally some of our routine thought processes. See, e.g., I. HuNGERLAND, 
POETIC DISCOURSE 127 (1958); Black, Metaphor, in MODELS AND METAPHORS 25 
(1962). It seems to me quite likely that this process is at least one of the implicit 
purposes of the Constitution, but proving that hypothesis is beyond the purview of 
this Essay. 
14. Fear of the possible results of judicial interpretation may explain a large part 
of this aversion. It has been 114 years since any very broad language was added to 
the Constitution (the ratification of the fourteenth amendment), and the rough road 
travelled by both the Equal Rights Amendment and the various proposed "right to 
life" amendments suggests that we may never again add a constitutional provision of 
similar openness. Quite possibly, it is only a fortunate historical accident that aggres-
sive judicial review arose only after the enactment of those constitutional provisions 
which now occupy most of the Supreme Court's time. Perhaps such active review has, 
for all practical purposes, foreclosed the possibility of ever again achieving the con-
sensus necessary to add similar provisions to the Constitution. 
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have feared a constitutional convention because too much might 
be changed, 15 even though such changes would still require ratifi-
cation by the states. On the other hand, we certainly do not sus-
pend Congress or the state legislatures for fear that they might 
legislate too much-however appealing that suggestion may at 
times seem. 
Despite these important differences, we would be mistaken to 
view constitutional language as a wholly unique creature. The 
seemingly intentional openness of many constitutional terms, 
upon which most of the supposition about the uniqueness of con-
stitutional language is based, 16 has counterparts in other areas of 
law, especially in American law. The generality of "equal protec-
tion of the laws" or "the freedom of speech" differs little from the 
language in Rule lOb-S of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, which prohibits the employment of "any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud." 17 Likewise, the fourth amendment's prohibi-
tion of "unreasonable" searches and seizures provides no more 
guidance than the Sherman Act's ban on "[e]very contract, combi-
nation . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
•••• "
18 As a result, the task of the courts in putting flesh on the 
skeleton of the Constitution is not wholly different from the task 
that courts have undertaken in developing the elaborate structure 
of tests, rules, and standards that surround and govern the appli-
cation of the securities laws, the antitrust laws, and many other 
statutory schemes. 19 
15. See generally Dellinger, The Recurring Question q( the "Limited" Constitu-
tional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623 (1979); Dellinger, Who Controls a Constitutional 
Conventlon?-A Response, 1979 DUKE L.J. 999; Fordham, Some Observations Upon 
Uneasy American Federalism, 58 N.C.L. REV. 289 (1980); Gunther, The Convention 
Method o/ Amending the United States Constitution, 14 GA. L. REV. I (1979); Tribe, 
Issues Raised By Requesting Congress lo Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a 
Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627 (1979); Van Alstyne, .Does Article V 
Restrict the Slates to Calling Unlimited Conventions Only?-A Leiter 10 a Colleague, 
1978 DuKE L.J. 1295; Van Alstyne, The Limited Constitutional Convention-TheRe-
curring Answer, 1979 DUKE L.J. 985; Note, Good Intentions, New Inventions, and Arti-
cle V Constitutional Conventions, 58 TEx. L. REV. 131 (1979). The implicit theme of 
most of the recent literature, whieh has attracted an all-star lineup of constitutional 
scholars, is that an unlimited convention is fraught with danger. 
16. See supra note 3. A pervasive problem in attempting to generalize about 
constitutional language is that constitutional language is hardly uniform in degree of 
generality, in purpose, or in historical origin. This recognition of the diversity of 
constitutional language is most prominently associated with Justice Frankfurter. See, 
e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414-15 (1945). See generally H. THOMAS, 
FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 127-47 (1960). 
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (1981). 
18. 15 U.S.C. § I (1976). 
19. Note, for example, the intermingling of examples from both constitutional 
and statutory interpretation in E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 
- (1949). 
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If the openness of constitutional language does not provide its 
uniqueness, perhaps the notion of presupposition,20 which under-
girds Hart's argument in "Definition and Theory in Jurispru-
dence,"21 can explain the uniqueness. State~ents oflaw, or in law 
(as opposed to statements about law}, presuppose the existence of 
a legal system, and particular statements of legal rules themselves 
contain presuppositions.22 Thus, the statement "the corporation is 
liable in damages" presupposes a body of law creating and defin-
ing a "corporation." But presupposition is hardly unique to law. 
When we use "home run" or "small slam," we presuppose the sys-
tems of baseball and bridge, respectively, and when we use "pro-
fessor" or "hour examination," we similarly presuppose the 
existence of a college or university, which is in tum defined by a 
(probably looser) set of constitutive rules.23 Legal language is not 
special because it contains presuppositions, but rather because it 
alone contains presuppositions which relate to the existence of a 
legal system. 
In this sense, then, constitutional language is unique because 
it, and no other language, presupposes the existence of a constitu-
tion, and incorporates those particular presuppositions which con-
cern the role of a constitution in a given legal system. But this is 
not going to get us very far, because the presuppositions of consti-
tutionalism are themselves both vague and contested. Unlike the 
specific terms of a general legal system, which, to some extent, 
relate to relatively uncontroversial presuppositions about the way 
the legal system operates, the terms of a constitution themselves 
determine the differences between the constitutional presupposi-
tions and other legal presuppositions. Therefore, an initial search 
for constitutional uniqueness reduces itself to circularity because 
the presuppositions of a constitutional system are dependent on 
our view of the language of a constitution. Perhaps constitutional 
language is unique. But we cannot articulate the differences 
which make it unique simply by examining the presuppositions of 
constitutionalism. Rather, we must examine the language in order 
to discover the differences between the presuppositions embedded 
20. "When did you stop beating your wife?" contains a prototypical presupposi-
tion in that it presupposes, but does not assert, that you have a wife and that you have 
beaten her. Presuppositions are not asserted to be true or false, but undergird the 
thought and language of people. See also J. AUSTIN, WoRDS, supra note 7, at 48-52; 
J. SEARLE, SPEECH AcTs (1969). See generally Strawson, On Referring, 59 MIND 320 
(1950). 
21. Hart, .Definition and Theory, supra note 5, at 37. See supra note 5. 
22. This notion is embodied in Hart's theory of the "internal" point of view. 
H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 54-60, 84-88, 97-107, 138-44. 
23. See J. SEARLE, supra note 20, at 33-42, 184-87. See also Harris, .Do Performa-
tives Still Exist? (Paper presented at the Pacific Division of the American Philosophi-
cal Association, March, 1980) (copy on file at UCLA Law Review). 
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in that language and the presuppositions included in the language 
of statutes or the common law. 
These observations on the presuppositional nature of consti-
tutional language are neither interesting nor important enough to 
provide the touchstone for a theory of constitutional language. 
They show, however, that certain uses of language have distinct 
meanings because of the context in which they occur.24 When an 
entomologist talks about "bugs," when a physicist describes some-
thing as "solid," and when a logician refers to "implication," each 
uses those terms in a more technical and precise sense than the 
ordinary person uses them. We know this because we know some-
thing about the special context in which entomologists, physicists, 
and logicians speak.25 Similarly, the context in which lawyers talk 
determines their use of "real property" (which is not the opposite 
of "fake property") or "wrongful" (which refers to conduct that 
may have no moral counterpart in ordinary language). Unlike 
strictly technical legal terms, such as "habeas corpus," "demur-
rer," and "curtesy," which have no ordinary language meaning, 
the technical uses of "real property" and "wrongful" are ,parasitic 
on ordinary language.26 If this phenomenon occurs in: conven-
tional (non-constitutional) legal language, then the equally para-
sitic nature of certain constitutional terms, such as "equal 
protection of the laws," "free exercise of religion," and "search 
and seizure" should not surprise us. These are expressions de-
rived from ordinary language, but their constitutional meaning in 
the context of constitutional adjudication diverges in important 
ways from the ordinary meaning that first generated each expres-
sion. The constitutional presuppositions of constitutional lan-
guage may not establish the complete uniqueness of constitutional 
language, but they do emphasize the context from which the 
words take their meaning. 
II. THE INTENTIONAL PARADIGM 
Most discussion of constitutional language takes place within 
what I call the "intentional paradigm" -the assumption that any 
24. On contextual definition, see J. AusTIN, supra note 20; J. SEARLE, supra note 
20; L. WriTGENSTEIN, supra note 7; Frankena, Some Aspects of Language, in LAN-
GUAGE, THOUGHT & CULTURE 121-23 (P. Henle ed. 1958); Ryle, Ordinary Language, 
in ORDINARY LANGUAGE 24 (V. Chappell ed. 1964). For a somewhat controversial 
application of the notion of contextual definition to the problem of obscenity, see 
Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity':· An Exercise in the Inter-
pretation of Constitutional Language, 61 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979). 
25. There has been surprisingly little discussion of technical language in the phil-
osophical literature, but one noteworthy source is Caton, Introduction to PHILOSOPHY 
AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE at V (C. Caton ed. 1963). 
26. See generally Morrison, Technical Language (and the Law), 10 COLONIAL 
LAW. 18 (1980). 
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interpretation of the constitutional text must comport with the ex-
plicit, implicit, reconstructed, or fictionalized intentions of the 
drafters. In its crudest and least plausible version, the intentional 
paradigm focuses on the results that the drafters specifically had 
in mind.27 Thus, because we can show that the drafters of the due 
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments intended 
to invalidate lengthy imprisonment without trial, we can be confi-
dent that we are correct in applying those provisions to that end.28 
Conversely, because we can fairly clearly infer that those same 
drafters did not intend to invalidate prejudgment real estate at-
tachment for the purpose of securing a potential money judg-
ment,29 we can be equally confident that we are correct in refusing 
to apply the due process clause to invalidate prejudgment real es-
tate attachment. Use of the same methodology would support the 
27. The nature of the ratification process makes the search for original intent in 
constitutional adjudication especially problematic. Are the states presumed to have 
ratified the intent of the drafters as well as the language those drafters wrote? What if 
legislative history from state legislatures shows that different states ratified for differ-
ent reasons? What if the intent of the drafters is unavailable to the states? Given the 
nature of my conclusions, I need not attempt to answer these very troubling questions, 
but they cannot be avoided by any theory that is tied to original intent. 
Even if we put the "whose intent?" question aside, we must still address two 
different questions. The first is "What results would the drafters have intended had 
they been confronted with the problems and context oftoday's world?" This question 
seems largely unanswerable, inviting the most speculative kind of historical psychoa-
nalysis. This formulation of the issue has, however, attracted a substantial following. 
See, e.g., L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 21 (1975); Murphy, Book Review, 87 YALE 
L.J. 1752, 1770 (1978). 
The other question that could be asked is "What results did the drafters specifi-
cally intend?" This question is, at least, one that is possible to answer, although much 
of this Essay contends that it is still the wrong question. This question is at the heart 
of the much discussed theories of Raoul Berger. R. BERGER, GovERNMENT BY JuDI-
CIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). The as-
sumption that clear or unmistakable intent, as evidenced in historical documents, is 
the exact equivalent of a textual statement to that effect is central to Berger's thesis. 
See, e.g., id. at 368; Berger, A Political Scientist as Constitutional Lawyer: A Reply to 
Louis Fisher, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 147, 162-63, 167 (1980). See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 
400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting in part); Harper v. 
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,677-78 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402-03 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
Among current members of the Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist most clearly sub-
scribes to the view that original intent is dispositive. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 
U.S. 762, 777-86 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 
634, 649-64 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in Sugarman and also in In re Griffiths, 
413 U.S. 717 (1973)). Because, as should be apparent from all of this Essay, I disagree 
with Berger's assumption as to what is the proper question, I have no need to deal 
with the issue of whether Berger's own answers to his question are even correct. It is 
certainly not abundantly clear that they are. See, e.g., Murphy, supra, at 1754-60. 
28. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken 
Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). 
29. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 344-51 (1969) (Black, 
J., dissenting); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). 
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first amendment's application to prior restraints and at the same 
time justify excluding its application to obscenity, defamation, 
commercial speech, and blasphemy.3o 
The specific intention theories of constitutional interpreta-
tion, of which the writings of Raoul Berger represent the most ex-
treme example,31 are the least plausible of any of the theories 
discussed in this Essay. They are implausible precisely because 
they ignore the distinction between the meaning of a rule (such as 
a constitutional provision) and the instances of its application.32 
When we draft any rule, we envision certain particular appli-
cations of that rule, certain cases where the rule will produce a 
particular outcome. We do not merely list these outcomes in a 
series of specific commands because we do not see those particular 
outcomes as exhaustive. They are only instances of a more gen-
eral problem, and we analyze the problem to discover some un-
derlying unity in the instances that we wish to treat. 33 We then 
formulate the rule to deal with this general unitary problem. By 
formulating a rule in general terms, the rule extends, by the nature 
of language, further in time or space than those particular applica-
tions envisaged by the drafters of the rule. 
This is a commonplace observation,34 and we can easily im-
30. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), is the Supreme Court's most ex-
plicit statement of the now-repudiated "prior restraints only" interpretation of the 
first amendment. /d. at 462. For references to other historical exclusions, see, e.g., 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); L. 
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERI-
CAN HISTORY (1960). 
31. See supra note 27. 
32. "The provisions of the Federal Constitution, undoubtedly, are pliable in the 
sense that in appropriate cases they have the capacity of bringing within their grasp 
every new condition which falls within their meaning. But, their meaning is change-
less; it is only their application which is extensible." Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 451 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). See 
also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (Sutherland, J.); 
) T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 124 (8th ed. 1927). 
This distinction parallels the philosopher's related distinetions between eonnota-
tion and denotation, and intension and extension. See W. ALSTON, PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE 17 n.8 (1964); J.S. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC (8th ed. 1904); W. SALMON, 
LOGIC 122-29 (2d ed. 1973). See also J. HOSPERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPH-
ICAL ANALYSIS 40-54 (2d ed. 1967). The distinction also parallels those between sense 
and reference. See FREGE, On Sense and Reference, in TRANSLATIONS FROM THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF GOTTLOB FREGE 58 (P. Geach & M. Black eds. 1952) 
("Sense" and "referenee" are the generally accepted English translations of Frege's 
"Sinn" and "Bedeutung."). But, not wishing to carry more philosophical baggage 
than I must, I will stick to a distinction between the meaning of a rule and the in-
stances of its application. 
33. "[A] principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mis-
chief which gave it birth." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910), quoted 
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J. joined by Powell 
and Stevens, JJ.). 
34. See Munzer & Niekel, supra note 2, at 1031; Bridwell, supra note 9, at 914-15. 
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agine examples of the distinction between meaning and instances 
of application in constitutional interpretation. For example, pun-
ishment by electric shocks to the genitalia falls plainly within the 
eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments even though the drafters could not have imagined this par-
ticular procedure in 1791.35 
This much is relatively uncontroversial, but it does not take 
us very far because, at some point, the new applications are so 
different that the meaning has changed.36 The "meaning" of a 
cruel and unusual punishment clause prohibiting only painful and 
humiliating punishment is different from one prohibiting capital 
punishment.37 The "meaning" of an equal protection clause 
prohibiting only racial discrimination is different from the mean-
ing of an equal protection clause prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of, say, gender,38 alienage,39 illegitimacy,40 or wealth.4 1 And 
the meaning of "the freedom of speech" that includes only polit-
ical argument42 is different from the meaning of ''the freedom of 
speech" that includes the right to advertise pharmaceutical 
prices43 or the right to display a "For Sale" sign on a front lawn.44 
I am not contending that such shifts in constitutional mean-
ing arc constitutionally impermissible. I am saying only that they 
On generality as part of the nature of law, see H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 20-23, 
234. 
35. q: United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (broad extension of concept 
of religion for purposes of statutory exemption from conscription for conscientious 
objectors). But cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (emphasis on the histori-
cal legitimacy of the Amish church). 
36. See Munzer & Nickel, supra note 2, at l-31. This seems to have been Justice 
Sutherland's point. See supra note 32. 
Whether there is a shift in meaning may depend on why a particular provision. is 
in the Constitution. The narrower the reason, the more likely it is that a new applica-
tion will be beyond the scope of that reason and will therefore constitute a shift of 
meaning. Conversely, the broader the reason taken to justify the provision in the text, 
the more likely it is that subsequent applications will still be within the scope of that 
reason, and therefore not represent a change of meaning. 
37. See supra note 34. But if you define the first meaning differently, then the 
application may involve no shift. 
38. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
39. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
40. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
41. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973) (re-
jecting strict scrutiny). 
42. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT (1948), reprinted in A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CoNSTITU-
TIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political 
Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 
(1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 41 IND. L.J. l 
(1971); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 196! SuP. CT. REv. 245. 
43. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, lne., 
425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
44. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
808 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:797 
are shifts in meaning, and thus are neither explained nor justified 
by the distinction between the meaning of a rule and the instances 
of its application. For such explanation or justification we must 
look elsewhere. 
The defects of the specific intention approach have been am-
ply documented in the literature,45 and there is little need for me 
to belabor these criticisms here. Intriguingly, however, even the 
most vehement crities of the specific intention approach still feel 
obliged to tether their arguments to some form of original intent. 
According to Laurence Tribe46 and Ronald Dworkin47, for exam-
ple, the extremely general language in the Constitution conclu-
sively proves the drafters' intent that subsequent generations 
should work out their own theories applying such phrases as cruel 
and unusual punishment, due process of law, equal protection of 
the laws, and so on. John Hart Ely implicitly criticizes wide ex-
cursions from the text as a whole, 48 but his argument is as re-
vealing as it is interesting. Ely bases his deference to the text on 
the idea that the text constitutes the best evidence of the drafters' 
intent.49 The text, for Ely as for the others, is still a way of bring-
ing forward the intentions of the framers. 
Those who argue within the framework of this "intentional 
paradigm" appear to operate on the model of the "convention" in 
the game of bridge. When bridge players reach a certain level of 
proficiency, they begin to use artificial conventions in bidding. 
These bids do not represent the intended contract, but rather aim 
at describing specific features of the bidder's hand or at asking 
questions about the partner's hand. The bids are in a code whose 
primary ordinary meaning ("clubs" means clubs) may be irrele-
vant to the specific contextual use. Most bridge players use simple 
conventions like Blackwood or Stayman, and more advanced 
players are likely to use complex systems containing a high per-
centage of so-called "artificial" bids. These systems and conven-
45. See, e.g., Bridwell, supra note 34; Lusky, "Government By Judiciary':· What 
Price Legitimacy?, 6 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 403 (1979); Munzer & Nickel, supra note 
2, at 1030-33; Murphy, supra note 27; Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEx. L. REv. 579 
(1978); Perry, Book Review, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 685 (1978). Although it is possible 
that we have ignored the relevance of history and original intent, see Monaghan, The 
Constitution, supra note l, at 117, it seems that we have more often succumbed to the 
error of ignoring Joseph Story's admonition that "Nothing but the text itself was 
adopted by the people." 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 300 (4th ed. 1873). 
46. See supra note 3. 
47. R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 133; Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981). 
48. J. H. ELY, supra note 1; Ely, The WagesofCrying Wo(fi A Comment on Roe 
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). 
49. "(T]he most important datum bearing on what was intended is the constitu-
tional language itself." J.H. ELY, supra note l, at 16. 
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tions are languages designed in part, like other languages, to 
convey information. But the important feature of a bridge con-
vention (or indeed the notion of bidding at all) is that the use of 
conventions is derived from and directed towards one quite simple 
fact-in the game of bridge, you are not permitted to look at your 
partner's cards. If a player could look at his partner's hand before 
arriving at the final contract, he could dispense with every conven-
tion yet devised. 
Many people understand constitutional language in much the 
same way as a bridge convention. Under the intentional para-
digm, constitutional language exists only because we are unable to 
know the specific intentions (the cards) of the drafters. If we 
could ascertain that specific intention, or if we knew how the 
drafters would treat the constitutional problems of the present, we 
would have no need for constitutional language. To the extent 
that we know that intention, then the importance of the text is 
diminished pro tanto. so 
This is not a useful model, for it fails to capture the sense in 
which a text is authoritative as a text. No amount of looking into 
the minds of the framers, or constructing fictionalized intentions 
at various levels of abstraction, can render the text less authorita-
tive. 51 The text is not only the starting point, but is also in some 
special way the finishing point as well. Constitutional language 
exists not only because the constitutional convention is not still 
sitting, nor because James Madison and his colleagues were not 
immortal. The text interposes itself between the intentions of the 
framers and the problems of the present, cutting off the range of 
permissible access and references to original intent, thereby reduc-
ing the extent to which original intent persists after the text's . 
SO. This is implicit in any view that treats "unmistakable intention" as being 
equivalent to text. See supra note 27. The difficult question occurs, however, when 
the text and the legislative history are in some way inconsistent. On this point, the 
canons of interpretation are not helpful, because one canon suggests that we look at 
the legislative history only when the text is unclear, and another says that we can look 
at legislative history to reject a textual statement inconsistent with that history. Com-
pare Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,490 (1917), with United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979). See generally, Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and 
the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
892 (1982). 
It is unfortunately common for commentators to contlate textual and historical 
approaches to constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 42, at 8; Grey, 
Unwrillen Constitution, supra note l, at 712-13; Perry, lnterpretivism, Freedom of Ex-
pression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 280-81 (1981). The two ap-
proaches are, however, fundamentally different. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 
TEX. L. REV. 695, 707 (1980). See also Alexander, supra note 2. 
S l. J. STORY, supra note 45, at 300; Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 
COLUM. L. REV. 381, 399-402 (1941); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 
82 YALE L.J. 227, 254 (1972). See also Chevigny, Pht1osophy of Language and Free 
Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 174 (1980). 
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adoption. A theory of constitutional language is incomplete if it 
does not recognize the way in which a text is authoritative - the 
way in which we treat the Constitution, but not, for example, the 
Declaration of Independence or the Mayflower Compact, as law. 
The authoritativeness of a text is by no means a peculiar fea-
ture of a written constitution. Although constitutional law is ex-
citing and popular at the moment, we. should not forget our basic 
law school contracts principles. One such basic principle requires 
that the parties be held to the reasonable meaning of the terms 
they have used, regardless of their subjective intent at the time 
they used those words. 52 And. tpe considerations that led to ac-
ceptance of this "objective" theory of contracts53 are the same as 
those that generated other common law rules, for example the 
"plain meaning" rule in the common law of defamation.54 
What the analogy with contract law shows us, however, is not 
something about contracts, or even about law. The analogy il-
luminates, rather, something about language in general, of which 
the language of a written constitution and the language of a con-
tract are subsets. In order to make sense of language, we presume 
52. "If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he 
used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law im-
poses upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or 
something else of the sort." Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York, 200 F. 
287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand, L., J.). 
53. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946) 
(Frank, J., concurring). See also Mansfield v. Hodgdon, 147 Mass. 304, 17 N.E. 544 
(1888); Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 127 Mo. App. 383, 105 S.W. 
777 (1907); Smith v. Hughes, 6 Q.B. 597 (1871). See generally 1 A. CoRBIN, CoRBIN 
ON CONTRACTS § 106 (1963); 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 539, at 82 
(1963); L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 10 (2d ed. 1965). 
Corbin maintains that it is an "illusion" that words have meaning independent of 
those who use them. 1 A. CoRBIN, supra,§ 106, at 474. Were it not for that "illusion," 
however, we would have no way of understanding each other. This is the whole point 
of any theory of meaning that stresses language as a rule-governed form of behavior. 
See, e.g., ]. SEARLE, supra note 20, at 33-50; B. HARRISON, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 165-258 (1979). 
Moreover, Corbin's eritique of a strictly objective view exposes an important am-
biguity in our use of the term "objective," To the extent that "objective" suggests 
certainty or precision, then Corbin's criticism is well taken. But if "objective" sug-
gests only that we interpret on the basis of external factors, including the conventions 
of language, but excluding the intentions of the language user, then a theory can be 
objective without making any claim of precision or certainty. It is the latter sense of 
· "objective" that is at the heart of the objective theory of eontracts and also at the 
heart of the theory of constitutional interpretation suggested in this Essay. 
54. See, e.g., Lorentz v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 155 F.2d 84, 87 (9th Cir. 
1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 727 (1946); Lyman v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 
286 Mass. 258, 260, 190 N.E. 542, 543 (1934); Roberts v. Camden, 103 Eng. Rep. 508, 
509 (K.B. 1807). See generally W. ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND 
SLANDER§ 93, at 144 (2d ed. 1887); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ Ill, at 747 (4th ed. 1971). 
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that it represents the intentional acts of human beings.55 But there 
is a difference between the intention of a text and the human 
thoughts that accompanied the creation of that text. Although the 
authority of a text is derived in part from the intention that it be 
authoritative, a text can have purpose without reference to the 
psychological condition of its creator, as we see in the attempts of 
courts to derive purpose from statutes themselves.56 As one phi-
losopher has put it, "[c]ommunication is a public, social affair and 
[the communicator] is not exempted from responsibility for as-
pects of his performance he failed to notice."57 Thus, "a speaker 
is not the sole arbiter over what import his utterances have," 58 and 
our touchstone must be the rules of language rather than largely 
futile explorations into the mind of the communicator. So long as 
the distinction between "what he said" and ''what he meant to 
say" is meaningful, then we must recognize that the conventions 
oflanguage use are superior, in the hierarchy of interpretive tools, 
to the intentions of the speaker. This is even more true when the 
language used has an authoritative embodiment, as in a statute or 
in a written constitution. 
The intentional paradigm implicitly confuses a language with 
a code (as in "morse code" rather than in "Uniform Commercial 
Code"). Codes, such as bridge conventions, are only one form of 
language,59 and it is wrong to assume that every language is a 
code. In theory, codes are dispensable, as the bridge example 
demonstrates, but language is not. Moreover, language operates 
only because it has meaning, quite apart from what the speaker 
may have meant to say.60 Perhaps meaning is use,61 but the inten-
55. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) l (1824), John Marshall noted that 
those who ratified the Constitution "must be understood ... to have intended what 
they have said." /d. at 188. 
56. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statures, 47 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 527, 538-39 (1947). See generally P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 31-44 (1975). 
57. P. JONES, PHILOSOPHY AND THE NoVEL 183-84 (1975). The dispute between 
the "intentionalists" and the "anti-intentionalists" is prominent in contemporary phi-
losophy of literary criticism. The dispute is described and fully documented in P. 
JUHL, INTERPRETATION: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY CRITICISM 
(1980). Juhl himself is an intentionalist. There is much in the corpus of writing about 
literary interpretation that is of great importance to the constitutional theorist, both 
for intentionalists and anti-intentionalists like. myself. 
58. P. JONES, supra note 57, at 183-84. See also S. CAVELL, MusT WE MEAN 
WHAT WE SAY? 32 (1969). 
59. Perhaps the characteristic feature of a code is that it is perfectly translatable 
into some language. Natural languages, however, arising in the context of particular 
cultures, are not necessarily perfectly translatable into other natural languages. See 
W. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1960). 
60. See generally P. JoNES, supra note 57, at 182-99; J. SEARLE, supra note 20; J. 
SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS 
(1979). For a more intention-oriented theory of meaning, see Grice, supra note 7, at 
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tions of the user do not determine exclusively, or even mainly, the 
use. 
In arguing for greater attention to the Constitution as an au-
thoritative text, I do not urge a literalist, conceptualist, or formal-
ist approach to constitutional adjudication.62 The view that the 
text can be interpreted as self-defining, or as ordinary language, 63 
or without reference to purpose64 does not follow from the propo-
sition that the text is authoritative. In many instances, we can de-
rive purpose from a text, 65 and we can apply canons of 
interpretat~on peculiar to the nature of the Constitution itself. 
Working out the details of such a program is difficult, but it is a 
task that cannot be avoided if we are to develop a theory of consti-
tutional interpretation that captures both the authoritativeness of 
the text and the necessity of contextual interpretation. 
Ill. MORAL THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE 
Many issues of constitutional interpretation concern the Con-
stitution's incorporation or non-incorporation of moral values. 
We must, then, examine the way in which the text either man-
dates, prohibits, or permits the use of certain moral arguments. 
Thus, I will propose questions that are metaethical, but in a rather 
special way. For, unlike most of the others who have asked 
metaethical questions,66 I will not ask how we reason about ethics, 
but rather when and how much we reason about ethics-at least in 
this constitutional law context. 
377; Grice, Utterer's Meaning and Intentions, 78 PHIL. REv. 147 (1969). A more so-
phisticated version is found inS. ScHIFFER, MEANING (1972). 
61. See supra note 7. 
62. The term "literalism" is ambiguous, because it is unclear where the literal 
meaning of the term at issue comes from. In one sense, every textually oriented the-
ory, including this one, is a version of literalism. But we more commonly equate 
literalism with the ordinary language definition of constitutional terms, or with the 
notion that the text provides clear answers to all of our problems. In this sense, liter-
alism shares both the characteristics and the flaws of what we usually refer to as 
"formalism" or "conceptualism." See H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 126; J. STONE, 
THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 149-65 (1946); Hart, supra note 6, at 270. On 
the distinction between literalism and interpretivism, see Grey, supra note 50, at 703, 
706 n.9. 
63. In addition to the authorities cited supra note 63, see Stone, supra note 6, at 
466, 472. 
64. On purpose-oriented interpretation, see Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to 
Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630 ( 1958). See also supra note 
56 & accompanying text. 
65. See P. JoNES, supra note 57, at 183-84, 194-95; Frankfurter, supra note 56. 
66. Whether there is a distinction between ethics and metaethics (between sub-
stantive ethical principles and the methodology of ethical inquiry) is by no means 
clear, because some metaethical views, particularly versions of relativism and subjec-
tivism, may tend to collapse the distinction. But the distinction serves tolerably well 
for my present purposes. 
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At the conclusion of his essay on "Constitutional Cases,"67 
Ronald Dworkin notes that the problem of rights against the state 
"argues for a fusion of constitutional law and moral theory, a con-
nection that, incredibly, has yet to take place."68 This statement is 
both revealing and ambiguous, for the key word "fusion" admits 
of a number of importantly different interpretations.69 Two items 
may become fused in a strong sense when they are merged so that 
the two are no longer separately identifiable; or they may become 
fused in a weaker sense when, although tightly joined, we can con-
tinue to identify the originally separate components. 
If we are to accept Dworkin's incredulity as justified, we must 
determine how much moral theory is to be merged into constitu-
tional law, where and how that merger is to take place, and how 
much of the· resultant product will be fused in the strong sense. I 
propose therefore to explore several "strategies of fusion," and 
their presuppositions about the Constitution and moral theory. 
A. Moral Theory as Constitutional Command 
In his essay "Cruel and Unusual Punishments,"70 Jeffrie 
Murphy introduces his argument by saying that "if one can 
mount a good argument that to treat a person in a certain way is 
gravely unjust or would violate some basic human right of his, this 
is also and necessarily a good argument that it is unconstitutional 
to treat him in this way."71 
The import of Murphy's characterization of constitutional ar-
gument is that if he is correct, then he has, in the same forty-six 
words,just written the Constitution?! For if any good moral argu-
ment is eo ipso a good constitutional argument, the text becomes 
superfluous.72 But surely the text must serve some purpose other 
than to offer a carte blanche for moral philosophizing. In fact, it 
defines the contours of permissible moral arguments. The authori-
67. R. DwoRKIN, supra note ll, at 131-49. 
68. Id. at 149. 
69. I do not mean to take Dworkin to task for this one word. The rest of his 
essay, as well as Dworkin's use of the word "connection" in the same sentence, cau-
tions us against taking Dworkin's metaphor as an argument. 
70. J. MURPHY, Cruel and Unusual Punishments, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND 
THERAPY 223-49 (1979). 
71. Id. at 223. 
72. The quoted sentence is hardly crucial to Murphy's fine analysis of the prob-
lem of punishment, and in that sense I suppose I am being unfair. But the sentence is 
there, and it provides a concise statement of a position that has at times surfaced in 
constitutional theory. See, e.g., Thomas Grey's description of a now "moribund" first 
form of non-interpretivist review in Grey, Origins, supra note l, at 844 n.8 (1978). 
For a powerful critique of theories that strive for congruence between constitutional . 
law and "correct" moral theory, see Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 353 (1981). 
814 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:797 
tative nature of the text, and the existence of a substantive content 
beyond a mere formal authorization73 for judges to philosophize, 
compels us to reject Murphy's notion of one-to-one fusion of con-
stitutional law and moral theory. In addition, we can find 
counterexamples to Murphy's theory; there are moral arguments 
that appear good yet irrelevant to the Constitution (for example, 
rights to safety in the workplace). Conversely, there are constitu-
tional issues, even in the Bill of Rights, that are only dimly illumi-
nated by moral argument (for example, the right to trial by jury in 
civil cases,74 and the right to keep and bear arms). 
Murphy's statement erroneously suggests a model of constitu-
tional law and moral theory as congruent circles. The more apt 
geometric metaphor is that of intersecting circles, which leaves 
areas of both constitutionally irrelevant moral argument and mor-
ally sterile constitutional argument. Viewed in this way, a good 
moral argument is no longer "necessarily" a good constitutional 
argument. That one has a moral duty to support one's parents in 
their dotage is fairly clear, but the Constitution does not deal with 
this duty, nor does it require that it be enforced or supplemented 
by the state. Conversely, a good constitutional argument is not 
necessarily a good moral argument, as for example the argument 
one would deploy in challenging the constitutional qualifications 
· of an able and mature thirty-three year old to hold office as Presi-
dent of the United States. A good moral argument is therefore a 
good constitutional argument only if it falls within that area of 
uioral theory embraced by the Constitution as relevant. The cru-
cial task remains, then, to define the contours of this area, and to 
determine the manner in which the constitutional text identifies 
constitutionally relevant moral theory. 
B. The General/ Particular Theory 
A more plausible theory than an interpretation that takes the 
moral or political flavor of the Constitution as a mandate for ren-
dering the text irrelevant is the "general/particular" theory of tex-
tual interpretation. This theory, which appears in various forms, 
takes the morally or politically oriented constitutional provi-
73. Without getting too deeply into the issue ofthe meaning and scope of judicial 
discretion here, I use formal authorization to refer to a norm that grants authority 
without specifying the substantive standards or constraints for the exercise of that 
authority. See Paulson, Material and Formal Authorisation in Kelsen's Pure Theory, 39 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 172 (1980). 
74. U.S. CoNST. amend. VII. My unargued assumption that this provision has 
little moral content derives some support from the fact that it remains one of the few 
provisions of the Bill of Rights that has not been incorporated by the fourteenth 
amendment. See Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La.), '!ff'd sub 
nom. Hill v. McKeithen, 409 U.S. 943 (1972). 
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sions-for example, freedom of speech, equal protection of the 
laws, and freedom of religion-not as discrete repositories of self-
contained moral or political theories, but rather as instances, or 
more particularized expressions of the single moral or political 
theory embedded in the Constitution. The theory, as most com-
monly expressed, does not merely say that instantiated constitu-
tional values are derived from higher and more general principles. 
It says that they are derived from one higher and more general 
principle. This theory is implicit in the work of theorists as di-
verse as David Richards75 and John Hart Ely,76 and is suggested 
in some parts of Ronald Dworkin's writings.77 Its proponents 
view the text as the raw material from which to construct a general 
moral or political theory of the Constitution. Because the gener-
ated theory must encompass the more particularized values ex-
plicitly stated in the text, it is not totally unbounded, but can claim 
a mandate from the text itself. 
The general/particular theory (or meta theory) is attractive 
because it evolves out of the text, while, at the same time, it is not 
constrained by the more uncomfortable moral or political gaps7s 
75. See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 51·54 (1977); Rich· 
ards, Constitutional Privacy, The Right to Die and the Meaning of Life: A Moral Ana/y· 
sis, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 327 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Richards, Constitutional 
Privacy]; Richards, supra note 1; Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional 
Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 
HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979); Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to 
Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1281 (1977). For Richards, "the 
concept of human rights" is his "unwritten constitution," Richards, supra note 1, at 
300-01, and it is this concept that he proceeds to use for the decision of particular 
cases. Richards acknowledges that there may be different conceptions of that concept, 
but that is not inconsistent with the theory that there is, for a particular analyst at a 
particular time, one unitary constitutional theory, and that is the methodology with 
which I take issue. 
76. J.H. ELY, supra note 1. I have heard Professor Ely's theory of the Constitu· 
tion described as "one big equal protection clause." His theory is far richer and more 
complex than that, but it is still one theory. For a quite different critique of unitary 
cons.titutional theories, including Ely's, see Gerety, Book Review, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 
35 (1980). 
77. Dworkin's general theory of adjudication is similarly both unitary and recon· 
structive in that he would have judges construct the unifying theory that provides "the 
best justification ... for the body of propositions of law already shown to be true 
. . ." Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: EssAYS IN 
HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 58, 82 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977). See also R. DWOR· 
KIN, supra note 11, at 81-130. Dworkin, however, explicitly recognizes the un-
derdetermination problem discussed in the text. ld at 64-68. See Alexander & 
Bayles, Hercules or Proteus? The Many Theses of Ronald Dworkin, 5 Soc. THEORY & 
PRAC. 267 (1980). It is questionable whether Dworkin's solution is really a solution. 
ld. In any event, there is much in his theory that would provide support for any 
particular I general theorist. 
78. The right to privacy, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and 
the right to travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), are perhaps the 
most prominent of these gaps. 
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in the Constitution. Thus, if we use the mentioned particulars as 
the building blocks for a theory, and then apply that general the-
ory directly to future cases, we can easily find a particular right to 
privacy,79 a particular right to travel,8° and so on, as well as even 
more particular rights derived from these rights. 81 So long as 
these rights are part of the general theory constructed from the 
mentioned particulars and are not inconsistent with the text, the 
absence of these particular rights in the text does not undermine 
their existence and application. The text operates somewhat like a 
ladder.82 We use it to build the theory, or perhaps to reconstruct 
the theory that was implicit all along. Having built the theory, we 
can kick away the ladder and then apply the theory directly. 
This methodology appeals to us because it captures, at a 
rather high level of abstraction, the intuitive feeling that the 
Constitution is incomplete. It also reflects the sense in which not 
only particular applications but also more general principles must 
change to accommodate changing circumstances. 83 Moreover, it 
justifies a wide range of morally or politically attractive results 
without totally rejecting the importance of the text. 84 Indeed, this 
methodology would be ideal but for the fact that it rests on two 
mistakes and one controversial assumption. 
First, any general/particular theory mistakenly assumes that 
one general principle (or theory) can be uniquely, or at least most 
correctly, derived from a set of particulars, or instances. This as-
sumption, however, ignores the extent to which any theory-sci-
entific, moral, or interpretive-is underdetermined by any number 
of specific instances or observations. 85 Theory is underdetermined 
79. The methodology under discussion here was most notable in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In that case, the Court used specific particulars, 
embodied in the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments, to construct a right to pri-
vacy and then applied that constructed right to the issue (contraception) at hand. See 
D. RICHARDS, supra note 75, at 81-109. 
80. See]. H. ELY, supra note I, at 177-79. 
81. Thus, Richards talks about various specific rights being generated by the 
right of privaey. See, e.g., Richards, Constitutional Privacy, supra note 75. 
82. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (D. Pears & B. 
McGuinness trans. 1961). I do not claim to be using Wittgenstein's ladder metaphor 
for the same purpose for which he used it. 
83. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 63 (1962);·A. BICKEL, THE 
MORALITY OF CONSENT 25-30 (1975); Munzer & Nickel, supra note 2; Richards, 
supra note I. 
84. Griswold did not generate nearly the avalanche of scholarly criticism that be-
fell Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See, e.g., ]. H. ELY, supra note 48, at 15, 66; 
Epstein, Substantive .Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. 
CT. REv. 159. Part of the explanation might be that the statute at issue in Griswold 
was substantially more ridiculous than that in Roe. The more likely explanation, 
however, is that the reliance on specific textual provisions, rather than on general 
liberty/due process considerations, made Griswold seem more palatable. 
- 85 .. The loci classici for the underdetermination thesis are P. DUHEM, THE AIM 
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in this sense because any number of empirical observations, or 
specific instances, can generate and be consistent with a large and 
perhaps infinite number of explanatory theories. Moreover, each 
such explanatory theory will yield different predictions or results 
for future cases.86 For example, a given set of symptoms can be 
consistent with a number of different medical diagnoses, and to 
that extent the diagnosis is underdetermined by the observation of 
symptoms. Similarly, several different theories about the forma-
tion of the solar system might be equally consistent with our ob-
servations about the solar system. The principle of 
underdetermination of theory applies to a wide range of activities, 
and it has been frequently discussed in reference to the philosophy 
of science, 87 to literary criticism, 88 to historical explanation, 89 and 
so forth. In each of these disciplines, theory acquires a different 
role, but the point remains the same: specific examples, instances, 
observations, or events can produce more than one theory equally 
consistent with those examples, instances, observations, or events. 
We see the same phenomenon in constitutional theorizing be-
cause a large number of different overarching theories would be 
consistent with the specific moral or political principles specified 
in the text. We may have good reasons to choose one theory 
rather than another, just as a doctor may have good reasons to 
choose one medical diagnosis over another that is equally consis-
tent with the same symptoms. But the constitutional text does not 
determine the choice among theories equally consistent with it, 
and thus the argument that the theory is generated by the Consti-
tution is seen to be a fake. Certainly we can require that the par-
ticular theory fit all of the textualized particulars as a necessary 
condition of its validity. But if this is taken to be a sufficient con-
AND STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL THEORY (P. Wiener trans. 1954); W. QUINE, FROM A 
LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW (2d ed. 1961); W. QUINE, supra note 59. 
86. One practical, rather than strictly logical, objection to the underdetermina-
tion thesis is that a large enough number of observations will cause "convergence" 
towards only one theory. See M. HESSE, REVOLUTIONS AND RECONSTRUCTIONS IN 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE at viii (1980). This seems to be the point implicit in 
Dworkin's references to "density." Dworkin, supra note 77, at 83-84. Apart from the 
fact that the convergence thesis itself has some logical difficulties, M. HESSE, supra, at 
viii-x, it seems plain to me that the constitutional/ext is hardly dense enough to rebut 
the problem of underdetermination in reference to constructing a theory from the 
text. 
87. See, e.g., C. GLYMOUR, THEORY AND EVIDENCE (1980); M. HESSE, supra 
note 86; M. HESSE, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE (1974); T. KUHN, 
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). 
88. See Rader, Fact, Theory, and Literary Explanation, 1 CRITICAL INQUIRY 245 
(1974). 
89. See generally R. ATKINSON, KNOWLEDGE AND EXPLANATION IN HISTORY 
(1978); R. MARTIN, HISTORICAL EXPLANATION: RE-ENACTMENT AND PRACTICAL IN-
FERENCE (1977). 
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dition, then there is little limit on the extent to which quite differ-
ent theories can find their source in the Constitution. If that is so, 
the text does not control the result in future cases and does not 
affect our decision of which competing coherent theory to accept. 
This does not mean that judges should be forbidden to construct 
moral or political theories,90 but it does defeat the claim that the 
theory so constructed is either mandated by or derived from the 
text. 
A general/particular theory makes its second mistake by 
presuming that the selection of particulars from which to construct 
or reconstruct the general theory is itself independent of theory. 
The process of selecting particulars is not and cannot be value-
neutral.91 Textually explicit particulars are analagous to observa-
tions from which we construct a theory, and we cannot lightly ig-
nore the extent to which such observations are controlled by 
theory.92 The instances are not just there waiting for us to build a 
theory around them. We have to select the particulars to use, and 
this selection process contains implicit judgments of value and 
importance. 
Interestingly, in this connection, most people who seek to 
build unitary moral or political theories of constitutional rights 
select (i.e., observe) the same constitutional provisions-the first 
amendment, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, 
the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the amend-
ments extending the franchise, and so on. They thus impose a 
theory_ on the Constitution more than they extract one from it.93 If 
the process of selection concentrates on different provisions, a dif-
ferent theory results. For example, John Hart Ely,94 who concen-
90. Even though the actual theory constructed will not, in my view, be textually 
mandated, the process of theory construction still aids in assuring principled adjudi-
cation. Thus, theory construction serves methodological goals of the legal system that 
are independent of the substance of the theory. See Golding, Principled Decision-
Making and the Supreme Court, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 35 (1963); Greenawalt, The En-
during Sign(ficance of Neutral Principles, 18 CoLUM. L. REV. 982 (1978). 
91. In this sense, "values" incorporates not only particular views about particular 
subjects, but also the experiences and training of the selector. Imagine an automobile 
accident observed by a surgeon, a tort lawyer, and an automotive engineer. If we 
asked each of them the question "What happened?," we would get fundamentally 
different answers which varied in the particular facts reported and the language used 
to describe the reported facts. 
92. See generally P. ACHINSTEIN, CONCEPTS OF SCIENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
ANALYSIS (1968); M. HESSE, supra note 86; K. POPPER, UNENDED QUEST 52 (1976) 
('There is ~? such thing as a perception except in the context of interests and expecta-
tiOns .... ). 
93. The story of the blind men and the elephant suggests just how easy it is to 
generalize on the basis of preselected and incomplete versions of the evidence. Saxe, 
The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Hlndoo Fable, in STORY POEMS 267 (L. Untcr-
meyer rev. ed. 1961). 
94. J. H. ELY, supra note 1, at IJ7-l0l. 
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trates on the majoritarian provisions of the Constitution, derives a 
theory quite unlike the theories derived by Dworkin and Rich-
ards, who concentrate on individual rights and anti-majoritarian 
aspects of the Constitution.95 And imagine the theory we might 
derive if we concentrated on the property-protecting provisions of 
the Constitution,96 perhaps including the second amendment as 
well?! Our selection depends on what we think is most important, 
and what we think is most important is pre-textual. Although 
some of these theories might be better than others, any theory 
based on something less than all of the constitutional text is selec-
tive,97 and the process of selection is hardly value-neutral. We see 
what we want to see and ignore what we want to ignore, and theo-
ries that purport to "explain" the Constitution usually explain 
only those portions of the Constitution that the theorist finds, for 
non-textually based reasons, to be most significant. 
The controversial assumption contained in any particu-
lar/general theory is that the morally or politically loaded clauses 
of the Constitution are particulars instead of more general irre-
ducible principles, and also that they are particulars of the same 
general principle.98 Some constitutional provisions, of course, are 
derived from higher principles. For example, the first amend-
ment's protection of freedom of speech might be plausibly derived 
from the political principle of popular sovereignty,99 and the 
equal protection clause is plausibly derived from some sort of 
"golden rule" or universalization principle. 100 But in order to 
construct a theory of the Constitution, we must assume that all of 
the textual provisions are reducible to one overarching principle. 
Thus, the methodology of a particular/general theory presupposes 
a unitary moral or political theory (albeit perhaps a highly com-
plex one 101) that explains and unites all but the purely structural 
constitutional provisions. 
95. See R. DwoRKIN, supra note 11; D. RICHARDS, supra note 75. 
96. Art. 1, § 10; amend. III; amend. IV; amend. V; amend. XIV. 
97. Even if all of the text is used, the weighting is selective. It is a mistake to 
assume that even "equal" weighting would be value-neutral, because the notion of 
equality is dependent upon the context. How would we react to a constitutional law 
casebook that devoted as much space to the third and twenty-third amendments as it 
did to the first and fourteenth? 
98. See supra notes 75-76. For Professor Dworkin the principle is that of "equal 
concern and respect." Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC & PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 126 
(S. Hampshire ed. 1978). 
99. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 42. 
100. On universalization, compare R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 7-50 (1963) 
to Schwartz, Against Universality, 78 J. PHIL. 127 (1981). 
101. There are, in fact, two ·kinds of unitary theories. One kind involves only one 
ultimate principle, such as Dworkin's principle of "equal concern and respect." See 
supra note 98. Other theories have two or more principles, but incorporate theories 
that relate those principles to each other in a priority relationship. See, e.g., J. RAwLs, 
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In order to evaluate this presupposition, we must question 
whether such an overarching theory can conceivably exist. If we 
follow Rawls, 102 Richards, 103 Dworkin, 104 Gewirth, 105 and others 
in believing that such a theory exists or can be constructed, then 
the search for a unifying theory of constitutional morality is high-
ly plausible. But if one accepts ethical pluralism 106 as a more ac-
curate reflection of reality, then freedom of speech, fair procedure, 
equality, and so on may be ultimate and irreducible primary val-
ues with no necessarily coherent relationship. 107 If this is true, 
then we need not tie these values together nor fill the gaps between 
them. If there is a plurality of first principles, then that, of course, 
means that in some cases they will conflict. 108 The pluralist would 
not wish to deny this, but would deny the existence of any con-
flict-resolving higher theory. 109 This makes constitutional in-
tepretation more difficult than it would be under a single unifying 
principle, but one cannot validly move from "it would be nice if it 
did" to "therefore it must," despite the prevalence of this move in 
many arguments for non-pluralist ethical theories. 110 
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). The distinction is therefore best expressed in terms of 
the complexity of the single ultimate principle. 
102. Id at 34-53. 
103. D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION (1971). 
104. Dworkin, supra note 98. 
105. A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978) ("Principle of Generic 
Consistency"). 
106. Perhaps the foremost pluralist of modem times is Isaiah Berlin. Berlin's most 
important works are collected in I. BERLIN, AGAINST THE CuRRENT: ESSAYS IN THE 
HISTORY OF IDEAS (H. Hardy ed. 1980); I. BERLIN, CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES: 
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (H. Hardy ed. 1979); I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 
(1969); I. BERLIN, RUSSIAN THINKERS (H. Hardy & A. Kelly eds. 1978). See also B. 
WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 166-86 (1973); Feinberg, Rawls and Intuitionism, 
in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS' A Theory of Justice 108 (N. Dan-
iels ed. 1975); Williams, Conflicts of Values, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF ISAIAH BERLIN 221 (A. Ryan ed. 1979). See generally B. BARRY, POLIT-
ICAL ARGUMENT (1965); R. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY (1959); H.L.A. HART, PuN-
ISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968). 
107. The relation of coherence is stronger than the relation of consistency. Two 
propositions, such as "It is snowing today" and "Napoleon lost at Waterloo" may be 
consistent with each other, although not possessing the relation of mutual entailment 
implicit in the idea of coherence. See generally A. WOOZLEY, THEORY OF KNOWL-
EDGE 129-75 (1949). A claim of coherence in any normative philosophy-moral, 
political, or legal-is a claim that in some way all of the norms of the system "fit 
together." Thus, coherence requires consistency, but the reverse is not true. I am now 
in the process of developing a fuller analysis and explication of the notion of coher-
ence in the philosophy of law, and my remarks here are a specific and tentative em-
bodiment of this larger project. 
108. J. RAWLS, supra note 101, at 34-40. 
109. ld See a/so B. BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 5-6 (1973). 
110. Rawls, concedes, however, that the desirability of having conflict-resolving 
higher principles is not eo ipso evidence of their existence. J. RAwLS, supra note 101, 
at 39. 
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I do not wish here to join further the debate between the plu-
ralists (Rawls' "intuitionists" 111) and the coherence theorists. 112 
But that dispute exists, and we must recognize that the argued 
mandate for constructing unitary moral theories around or 
through the Constitution derives from only one side of a highly 
contested deontological debate. Moreover, this one-sided view 
presupposes not only that ethical pluralism is wrong, but it must 
presuppose as well that pluralism is totally implausible despite the 
structure of the constitutional text which suggests plurality rather 
than unity. The arrangement of the text, with particular and dis-
crete provisions and with no expressed unifying principle save a 
vacuous Preamble, 113 appears to be the embodiment of pluralistic 
ethics. Thus, the task of the constitutional coherence theorist is 
not only to show that ethical pluralism is wrong, but also to refute 
the appearance of ethical pluralism in the text of the Constitution. 
IV. LANGUAGE AND THEORY 
In a much more promising start toward constructing a theory 
of constitutional language, Ronald Dworkin distinguishes "con-
cepts" and "conceptions." 114 His theory is incomplete, but its gaps 
can direct us toward a more satisfactory formulation. 
Despite its similarity to ordinary language associations, 
Dworkin's distinction between concepts and conceptions does not 
parallel the distinction between connotation and denotation, or 
between intension and extension. Rather, his distinction admits 
the existence of, and is derived from, differences in meaning 
rather than various applications of an agreed meaning. 115 A con-
Ill. Because "intuitionism" has been used to refer to a method of identifying 
moral values rather than the relation among them (and in this sense Rawls, Richards, 
Dworkin, and Gewirth may all be intuitionists), Rawls' terminology is a trifle mis-
leading. It has been suggested that "pluralism" would be a better appellation, as a 
plurality of values is used. B. BARRY, supra note 109, at 6. 
112. I use "coherence theorist" to refer to anyone who holds that there is one 
ultimate system of moral values, whether they be monists like Dworkin or priority-
ranked pluralists like Rawls. See supra note 101. 
113. See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 371 (1981). 
114. R. DwoRKIN, supra note II, at 134-37; Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981). See also J. RAWLS, supra note 101, at 10. For commen-
tary on the distinction, see Munzer & Nickel, supra note 2, at 1037-41; Saphire, Pro-
fessor Richards' Unwril/en Constitution of Human Rights: Some Preliminary 
Observations, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 305 (1979). See also D. RICHARDS, supra note 
75, at 44-56. 
115. This is so, except to the extent that changes in meaning (different concep-
tions) are built into what Dworkin means by a concept. R. DwoRKIN, supra note II, 
at 103, 134-37. In this sense, the meaning of a concept never changes, but this is only 
because in another sense the concept itself has no meaning apart from some concep-
tion of it. The real problem is that there is an inevitable tension between open pon-
cepts and most traditional theories of meaning. See generally M. WEITZ, THE 
OPENING MIND 25-48 (1977). 
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ception in Dworkin's scheme is a particular (but not necessarily 
particularized, in the sense of highly detailed) theory which is 
thought to explain the meaning of a concept. 1 16 A concept, there-
fore, allows competing theories of its meaning, and no one of 
these theories is necessarily more or less correct as a definition or 
explanation of the concept. 117 A concept is something 1 18 whose 
definition requires references to a theory, but no theory provides a 
uniquely correct definition. If only one plausible theory existed, 
then that theory would provide the definition of the concept, and 
there would be no need for the distinction between concept and 
conception. In order for the distinction to survive, then, there 
must be at least two competing conceptions (theories), neither of 
which is demonstrably better or more correct than the other as a 
definition of the concept. 
This distinction seems to hold great potential for a theory of 
constitutional interpretation, because, as Dworkin maintains, it 
enables us to argue alternative conceptions within the framework 
of the existing concepts set forth in the constitutional text. But the 
utility Of the distinction rests on the exact nature of a "concept." 
In order for any word, including a concept, to have a potential 
use, it must have some meaning which allows us to understand its 
use in the face of competing theoretical conceptions. One candi-
date for "some meaning" is the existence of a paradigm, or exem-
plar. W.B. Gallie contrasted "essentially contested concepts" 1 19 
(the notion from which Dworkin derives his distinction 120) with 
those words whose use was merely "radically confused." 121 For 
Gallie, the existence of an exemplar makes it possible to meaning-
fully use words whose essential characteristics are contested. 122 
Gallie offers the concept of a "champion" to demonstrate the 
116. R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 103, 134-37. 
117. Id. 
118. I use the word "something" deliberately, because there is a long tradition of 
philosophical debate about just what concepts are, some claiming they are words of a 
particular sort, some claiming they are mental images, and so on. See generally M. 
WEITZ, supra note 115, at 3-24; N. CAMPBELL, FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE 45 (1957). 
119. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc. 167 
(1955). See also W.B. GALLIE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 
(1964). For commentary, see Kekes, Essentially Contested Concepts: A Reconsidera-
tion, 10 PHIL. & RHETORIC 71 (1977); Garver, Rhetoric and Essentially Contested Ar-
guments, 11 PHIL. & RHETORIC 156 (1978). See also Booth, "Preserving the 
Exemplar" or, How Not to .Dig Our Own Graves, 3 J. CRITICAL INQUIRY 407 (1977); 
Mcintyre, The Essential Contestahility of Some Social Concepts, 84 ETHICS 1 (1973). 
Also useful is C. STEVENSON, Persuasive .Definitions, in FACTS AND VALUES 32 (1963). 
120. R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 103. 
121. Gallie, supra note 119, at 178-79. 
122. See id. at 176-86. Munzer and Nickel are cautious about taking up the ques-
tion .of the ultimate validity of the concept/ conception distinction and presumably are 
equally cautious about Gallic's original notion of essentially contested concepts. 
Munzer & Nickel, supra note 2, at 1039 n.46. 
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operation of an exemplar. 123 Modifying this example, we might 
contend that the New York Yankees of 1927 were the exemplar of 
a "great" baseball team. If, in this context, "great baseball team" 
marks an essentially contested concept, we nonetheless under~ 
stand the use of the concept because we recognize the authority 
and unattainable standards124 of the exemplar. Thus, if one base~ 
ball team's hitting and depth were stronger than that of the 1927 
Yankees, but its pitching was weaker, and if another team's pitch~ 
ing and depth were stronger but its hitting was weaker, we could 
contest whether either or both of these teams were entitled to the 
"great baseball team" designation. Although the concept is con~ 
tested, it retains meaning through a core of settled meaning, the 
exemplar, which allows us to debate about the shape and extent of 
the fringe. 
A more plausible candidate than the "exemplar," for "some 
meaning" that makes understanding of a contested concept possi-
ble, could be a "family resemblance." 125 Unlike the unattainable 
standards of the exemplar, the family resemblance has no set of 
necessary and sufficient defining characteristics, 126 but rather is an 
interlocking relationship among the appropriate uses of a term. 
Although the Wittgensteinian "family resemblance" does not ad-
mit of a core and fringe characterization, 127 it still contains exem-
plars. While we might debate whether some novel form of 
amusement is "really" a game, we have no doubt that Olympic 
games and party games are games, despite the absence of identifi-
able shared features. Without the existence of exemplars of some 
kind, we have not a contested concept, and perhaps not even Gal-
lie's "radically confused" concept, but perhaps just loose talk, or, 
even worse, vacuous talk. 
If this is so, then Dworkin's concepts have run into heavy 
weather. Almost certainly exemplars for freedom of speech, equal 
protection, and many other similar constitutional concepts have 
123. Gallie, supra note 119, at 176-79. 
124. The standard of being unattainable is important, although neglected by Gal-
lie, for if the exemplar were attainable there would be little to contest. The question 
would only be whether one had attained identity in all respects with the exemplar, in 
which case the concept would apply-or had not, in which case the concept would not 
apply. But if the exemplar is unattainable, then we can argue about which features 
are necessary in order for the concept to apply. 
125. L. WilTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL lNVESTIGATIONS §§ 65-72 (3d ed. G. An-
scombe trans. 1958). Wittgenstein's famous example is that of games. /d. at § 66. 
126. /d. 
127. See G. PITCHER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN 215-27 (1964); Chan-
dler, Three Types of Classes, 3 AM. PHIL. Q. 77 (1966). Hart has claimed that all legal 
terms could fit into the core and fringe characterization. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, 
1959 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 233, 239-40. This seems mistaken, however, because it ignores 
the existence of terms, sueh as family-resemblance terms, that do not have a single 
core. 
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never existed. There are exemplars for some, and Dworkin prop:-
erly points out that an exemplar exists for cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. 128 But surely no exemplar for "the freedom of speech" 
shares the common agreement implicit in Gallie's original formu-
lation of the essentially contested concept. Is imprisonment of a 
newspaper editor for publishing criticism of the government the 
exemplar of a free speech violation? It is not if we understand an 
aversion to prior restraint to be the essential feature of the mean-
ing of the "freedom of speech,"129 or if we take individual self-
expression through communication as the paradigm. 130 The iden-
tification of an exemplar in the absence of general agreement is 
dependent upon a particular theory. In the absence of an exem-
plar, however, it is difficult to see how a particular theory or con-
ception is or is not related to the concept at hand. 
From this perspective, constitutional adjudication builds ex-
emplars. But we encounter difficulty in locating the foundation 
on which to build the exemplar or theory. Though the words of 
the Constitution are the starting point, they give us very little 
guidance. 
Perhaps we should forget about concepts and conceptions, 
and look instead at words, but words of a certain sort. Here, we 
encounter a particular variety of words that cannot be understood 
without reference to a theory. 131 Not all words share this charac-
teristic equally, but some words or terms, such as "anal-retentive 
personality" or "kinetic energy" or "wave function," 132 can only 
be understood with reference to a theory. When we use terms 
such as these, we presuppose the existence of some theory, even 
though we do not explain the theory every time we use the terms. 
If theory-laden words can appear in non-legal texts, then similar 
terms ought to be able to appear in legal texts, and it seems prom-
ising to look at terms such as "the freedom of speech" and "equal 
protection of the laws" as such theory-laden words, except that 
128. R. DwoRKIN, supra note II, at 136 n.l. 
129. See supra note 30. 
130. See, e.g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA 
L. REv. 964 (1978). The focus is similar in Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: 
Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1974). 
131. Most of the existing literature is in the philosophy of science, although the 
point has much more universal application. See generally P. AcHJNSTEIN, CoNCEPTS 
OF SCIENCE 157-201 (1968); N. HANSON, PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY (1958); C. 
HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SciENCE 75 (1966); G. RYLE, DILEMMAS 90-91 
(1956). Philosophers of science refer to theory-ladenness in reference both to terms of 
this type and to observation, see supra note 91 & accompanying text, but it is impor-
tant to keep the two ideas distinct. · 
132. For a discussion of the theories to which these terms refer, see generally P. 
ACHJNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 180-83; N. HANSON, supra note 131, at 60. 
1982] CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE 825 
here the use of the term precedes the development of the theory, 
rather than following after it. 
If the use of the terms precedes the development of the the-
ory, the terms themselves may have no meaning other than some 
ordinary language associations and some syntactic meaning. 
Notwithstanding this fact, they are still in a text which we take to 
be authoritative. Their irremovable presence in the text must then 
be taken as a mandate for the development of a theory that will 
give content to the terms used. Significantly, the mandate does not 
derive from the personal intentions or states of the mind of the 
drafters of the document. It derives from the conventions that 
govern language use, conventions that operate without regard to 
the intentions of the user. 133 We argue unnecessarily and mislead-
ingly when we argue that the use of such terms provides evidence 
of an original intent by the framers that the underlying theories be 
developed and changed, an intent we can assume from the failure 
to use more specific terminology. 134 The constructed intent here is 
unnecessary, because the rules and conventions oflanguage cut off 
the necessity and possibly even the permissibility of looking be-
hind them into the mind of the speaker or writer. 
Philosophers commonly argue that if a speaker says p, and p 
logically entails q, then the speaker is committed to q even if he 
had never thought of q and never would have intended to say q. 135 
A similar convention of language use appears applicable to the 
use of theory-laden terms. When a speaker uses a theory-laden 
term, the speaker is committed to the theory that may at any time 
surround the use of the term, even if the speaker did not intend 
that result. If, for example, I accuse someone of having an anal-
retentive personality, my use of that term commits me to accusing 
him of having whatever an anal-retentive personality entails as a 
matter of psychiatric theory. And if I use terms such as "equal 
protection of the laws," that too commits me to having authorized 
the incorporation (and, if necessary, the creation) of a theory with-
out which the term's meaning is incomplete. 
Given that theories change, we can legitimately commit the 
user of theory-laden terminology to the possibility of change im-
plicit in any theory. Thus, the users of theory-laden language 
such as "the freedom of speech" and "privileges and immunities 
133. See supra notes 27-65 & accompanying text. 
134. See supra notes 46-49 & accompanying text. 
135. P. JoNES, supra note 57, at 182. See also S. BARKER, THE ELEMENTS OF 
LoGIC 7 (3d ed. 1980). The notion of commitment in this sense is central in the 
writings of John Searle. See J. SEARLE, supra note 20. For an interesting application, 
see Finnis, Scepticism, Se!f-Refutation, and the Good o/ Truth, in LAW, MORALITY, 
AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 247 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 
1977). 
826 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:797 
of citizens of the United States" are committed to the theory 
whose construction they have authorized by their choice of words. 
Whether or not the user of those terms intended to be so commit-
ted does not matter. It's just part ofthe rules ofthe game. Theory-
laden terms are incomplete, and the use of an incomplete term 
commits the user to the fact that the completion is going to come 
from somewhere else. The interpreter of the Constitution is thus, 
in some sense, like a musician working with a score that is not 
complete until it is interpreted; and in some sense like a trial law-
yer who is expected to make the best case possible with the avail-
able evidence. An interpretation becomes an explication rather 
than an explanation, 136 and we can hope for no more. 
Additionally, we can argue that all of ordinary language is 
theory-laden, 137 and indeed this is the assumption of much of 
Western metaphysics, embodied, for example, in the categories of 
Aristotle 138 and Kant.t39 But even if not all of ordinary language 
is theory-laden, it is fairly uncontroversial that at least much of it 
is. In some sense, the word "lunch" is theory-laden, at least as 
compared to "eating" or "placing organic matter in one's mouth 
for the purpose of introducing it into the digestive system." So, 
too, are terms like "time," "space," "hailing" a cab, "playing" a 
game, "sending" a letter, and "understanding" a book. We con-
stantly use expressions which presuppose or incorporate theories 
that do more than identify a physical object or activity. 
Thus, when we say that a term is theory-laden, we presuppose 
a particular point of view of the speaker with respect to which a 
term is theory-laden. I cannot explain to a person ignorant of 
baseball what a "home run" is without explaining a great deal of 
baseball, but it seems strange to describe "home run" as theory-
laden when one baseball player is talking to another. Similarly, I 
cannot explain a "trick" to a non-bridge player without explaining 
at least the rudiments of the game of bridge, even though "trick" 
136. "Explication, when. not simply a synonym for 'explanation,' is the process 
whereby a hitherto imprecise notion is given a formal definition, and so made suitable 
for usc in formal work. The definition does not claim to be synonymous with the 
original notion, since it is avowedly making it more precise." A. LACEY, A DICTION-
ARY OF PHILOSOPHY 66 (1976). The idea of explication is usually attributed to 
Camap. R. CARNAP, MEANING AND NECESSITY 7-8 (2d ed. 1956). See also W. 
QUINE, supra note 59, at 258-59. I am using "explication" in a slightly looser sense. 
We explicate when we work out a theory, and when we explicate we put something in, 
rather than just pulling something out. 
137. See Hesse, Theory and Value in the Social Sciences, in AcTION AND INTER-
PRETATION I, 1-2 (C. Hookway & P. Pettit eds. 1978). See also P. FEYERABEND, 
AGAINST METHOD 66 (1975). Whether there is or can be a value-free or theory-free 
observation language has been one of the perennial problems in the philosophy of 
science. 
138. See 0. ANSCOMBE & P. 0EACH, THREE PHILOSOPHERS 5-63 (1961). 
139. See J. HosPERS, supra note 33, at 184-86. 
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is not highly theory-laden in conversations between bridge play-
ers. But suppose that after a sequence of bidding I explain to my 
opponents at the bridge table that a particular bid was an "impos-
sible negative." I must then explain a bidding system or theory 
known as "Precision," without which the term "impossible nega-
tive" cannot be understood. 
We can clarify things by distinguishing between two forms of 
theory-ladenness. In the weaker sense, many of the terms of ordi-
nary language are theory-laden. But in a stronger sense, terms are 
only theory-laden if they force us to go outside the domain of dis-
course in which they are used. Thus, "lunch" and "time" are the-
ory-laden in the weaker sense but not in the stronger, because the 
theory that they presuppose is as much a part of ordinary lan-
guage as is the language itself. But "straight flush" or "anal-reten-
tive personality" or "habeas corpus," if used in ordinary 
conversation, are theory-laden in the stronger sense because they 
presuppose theories outside the domain of ordinary discourse. 140 
Therefore, we can say that terms are theory-laden in a strong 
sense only when they require us to go outside the context in which 
we are speaking. And that is why "habeas corpus" may be theory-
laden in ordinary language but not in law, as is even more true for 
terms like "pleading," "statute of limitations," or "appeal." 
This distinction applies directly to constitutional language. 
The requirement that the President shall have attained "the Age 
of thirty-five years" is theory-laden in the weak sense because it 
presupposes a theory of determining age. It also presupposes the 
deeper idea of determining growth with reference to chronology. 
But it is not theory-laden in the strong sense because it is uncon-
troversially known to all participants speaking within the domain. 
A reference in the Constitution to "habeas corpus," or "Con-
gress," or "amendment" is similar. But a term in the Constitution 
is 'theory-laden in the strong sense when it sends us outside the 
legal domain. "Freedom of speech" and "equal protection of the 
laws" are different from "habeas corpus" or "Congress," because 
they send us outside of the legal domain and into the moral or the 
political. That is also why the use of terminology that lacks mean-
ing within the domain in which it is used can be said to commit 
140. "(O]ne must always specify the theory with respect to which a given term is or 
is not 'theory-laden."' P. AcHINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 183. Although we often 
talk, especially in the context of constitutional theory, about vague or general terms, it 
is important to remember that vagueness is relative as well, and the degree of vague-
ness will depend on the particular context in which a term is used and the particular 
purposes for which it would or would not be vague. See I. ScHEFFLER, BEYOND THE 
LETTER: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO AMBIGUITY, VAGUENESS AND METAPHOR 
IN LANGUAGE 49-50 (1979). 
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the user to whatever meaning may appear in or be provided by 
another domain. 
V. LANGUAGE AS A CONSTRAINT 
Characterizing constitutional terms as theory-laden is prob-
lematic because the language then provides little if any guidance 
in our search for theory. Perhaps, therefore, a theory-authorizing 
view of constitutional language gives no weight to the text of the 
Constitution. Yet this view would mistakenly ignore the impor-
tant asymmetry between positive and negative responses. 141 Con-
stitutional language can constrain the development of theory, or 
set the boundaries of theory-construction, without otherwise di-
recting its development. Constitutional language can tell us when 
we have gone too far without telling us anything else. The state-
ment that "It doesn't mean that" need not necessarily occasion the 
response "Then what does it mean?" I can know some of what a 
term does not mean without knowing what it does mean, 142 just as 
I can tell you quite confidently that "the theory of relativity" does 
not mean "shirt collar" even though I have only the dimmest per-
ception of what "the theory of relativity" does mean. 143 
In this sense, we might do best to look at constitutional lan-
guage as a frame without a picture, 144 or, better yet, a blank can-
vas. We know when we have gone off the edge of the canvas even 
though the canvas itself gives us no guidance as to what to put on 
it. 
But if language constitutes the frame, then how does it do 
that? The ordinary language associations of theory-laden terms 
do not explain the frame-like quality of the words, because we 
would not hesitate to extend freedom of speech to black arm-
bands145 or oil paintings, although neither is "speech" in ordinary 
141. This is at the heart of the assertion that scientific theories can be falsified, but 
not verified. K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS (1963); K. POPPER, THE 
LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959). 
142. In one sense, of course, the more we know of what a term does not mean, the 
more we know of what it does mean. But the point is that our ability to exclude some 
possibilities is relatively independent of how many possibilities remain. 
143. One might point out in response that I do know what "shirt collar" means, 
and that is all I need to know that it is different from the theory of relativity. But I 
could make the same assertion about knowing that there is a difference between 
the theory of relativity and the Rule in Shelley's Case, although pace Professor 
Michelman, I could no more tell you what the Rule in Shelley's Case is than I could 
tell you what the theory of relativity is. 
144. H. KELSEN, supra note 15, at 245. 
145. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969). 
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language. 146 Furthermore, we would have little difficulty in hold-
ing universal tongue-boring to be a violation of the eighth amend-
ment, although the universality would prevent a finding that the 
punishment was "unusual" in the ordinary language sense. 147 We 
do, however, incorporate some very rough, pre-theoretical under-
standings into our sense of the limits of language. For example, it 
is probably largely pre-theoretical that castration as a punishment 
for jaywalking does not violate the principles of freedom of speech 
and that a fine of $1.00 for criticizing the President does not vio-
late the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 148 But this 
helps very little in most real cases. 
Perhaps, at best, we can only note the importance, as in all 
development of language, of moving in small steps. Highly the-
ory-laden constitutional language is like the ship, imagined by the 
philosopher Neurath, which is to be rebuilt while afloat and there-
fore can only be rebuilt plank by plank. 149 So long as the ship 
stays afloat during the process, it is no objection that the finished 
product bears little or no resemblance to the original. With con-
stitutional language, so long as the enterprise stays afloat it is no 
objection that the current conception bears no close relation to the 
ordinary language meaning of the text. 150 lf we have moved in 
small steps from the original text, the enterprise stays afloat. The 
question, then, is not necessarily whether the putative move is jus-
tified by the text, but whether the move is justified by the last 
move. 
In some ways, constitutional interpretation parallels some 
theories of literary criticism. 151 In literary criticism, or indeed in 
any artistic interpretation, we do not demand the uniquely correct 
interpretation, but only an interpretation justified by the text. The 
146. See Schauer, supra note 24, at 906-07; Schauer, Categories and the First 
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981). 
147. The Court's eleventh amendment doctrine represents perhaps the most direct 
repudiation of plain language to be found anywhere in constitutional law. See Mon-
aco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
148. For this point and the examples, 1 am indebted to Philip Devine. 
149. W. QUINE, supra note 59, at 3. Neurath used the metaphor to illustrate the 
progress of science. 
150. This seems to be part of the thrust of Munzer & Nickel's "ancestral relation." 
Munzer & Nickel, supra note 2, at 1054. Although the premises and conclusions are 
different, there are important parallels with the dialectic process described by Michael 
Perry. Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justifica-
tion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (1981). See also Jones, The Brooding Omnipresence of 
Constitutional Law, 4 VT. L. REV. 1 (1979); Monaghan, Professor Jones and the Con-
stitution, 4 VT. L. REV. 87 (1979); Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seri-
ously, 39 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
151. The statement in the text is, to some extent, true even for "intentionalist" 
theories, see Rader, supra note 88, but is even more true for "non-intentionalist" theo-
ries. See Fish, Facts and Fictions: A Reply to Ralph Rader, 1 CRITICAL INQUIRY 883 
(1975). See a/so supra note 58. 
830 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:797 
paint or text underdetermines an interpretation (a theory) of an oil 
painting or a literary work in the same way that the text of the 
Constitution underdetermines a constitutional theory. 152 The in-
terpretation must be plausibly coherent with the painting or the 
text, but an interpretation cannot be uniquely derived from 
the text or painting alone. Therefore no one interpretation is 
uniquely acceptable, just as no constitutional theory is uniquely 
acceptable in terms of the text. Although non-textual sources may 
mandate a particular result, such a mandate is not the function of 
the language. The language limits, but does not command. 
The analogy with literary criticism should not be pressed too 
far, because the literary critic has the freedom to select particu-
larly important parts of his text for attention, a freedom not nearly 
as available in constitutional interpretation. But the analogy does 
effectively capture the relationship between flexibility and an au-
thoritative text, a relationship that lies at the core of understand-
ing the nature of constitutional adjudication. 
Were this theory to be more fully developed, it might be said 
to be horizontally clause-bound, but not vertically clause-
bound.153 That is, it recognizes, as more free-wheeling theories do 
not, that the values specified in the text are more or less discrete, 
and that they have a textual preeminence over values not so speci-
fied. In this sense, it is horizontally clause-bound because each 
interpretation must derive originally from some particular portion 
of the text or from some justified interpretation of that portion of 
the text. It is vertically open because there is no limit on the 
source from which we can derive the full theory for the textually 
stated value, other than the intuitive, pre-theoretical limits placed 
on that theory by the language.154 
These discrete constitutional values are like a series of fun-
nels, separate from each other, but open to receive anything of the 
right size that may be poured into the11_1. Of course, if we extend 
the rims of the funnels too far, the funnels bump into each other, 
and the important conceptual separation becomes difficult to 
maintain. But that is a caution against the extremes, and not nec-
essarily a crippling failure of the notion of conceptual separation. 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 75-90. 
153. 1 draw the term "clause-bound" from J. H. ELY, supra note 1. Ely uses the 
term to refer to interpretation that views constitutional provisions as (a) self-con-
tained units and (b) capable of interpretation on the basis of the language and the 
legislative history alone. Id at 12-13. Ely's theory substitutes his view of the underly-
ing theme of the entire document (which he gets from the document itself) for both (a) 
and (b). 1 describe my suggestions as horizontally clause-bound because 1 accept (a), 
more or less, but reject (b). Underlying my idea is the assumption that if we stick 
moderately close to (a) we can reject (b) without suffering most of the dangers ofnon-
interpretivism that Ely properly identified. 
154. See supra text accompanying note 148. 
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Courts must supply content to those theory-laden terms that send 
us outside the domain of legal knowledge and legal discourse. 
That content need not come from philosophy (as argued by Dwor-
kin1ss and Richards1S6) or from history (as argued by Berger157) or 
from somewhere else. As I have argued in this Essay, the conven-
tions of language demonstrate that Berger's extreme form of his-
torical reference and even the more mild forms of historical 
interpretation 158 are mistaken as a matter of textual derivation. 
Historical reference is neither mandated nor implicit in a perma-
nently authoritative constitutional text. But although the text does 
not require a reference to history, it does not necessarily prohibit 
such reference. The text requires that we supply the theory, but 
there may be extra-textual, or extra-constitutional, reasons for 
constructing it from one source rather than from another. History 
is one possible source, but not the only possible source, and the 
same can be said for moral philosophy, or political policy, or any 
other source of values. 
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution has been written in a language, and a user 
of language must be taken to know and intend that the language is 
open to interpretation. Although a user of language has intentions 
that are relevant in determining what the user meant to say, the 
user has no power to veto the conventions of the language that 
have been used. Constitutional interpretations can change be-
cause the linguistic conventions and presuppositions change, even 
though the words remain the same. 159 Thus, a fixed reference to 
history or original intent seems curious. Even historians expect to 
interpret the past anew for each generation, 160 because perspec-
tive, and therefore meaning, is mutable. Of course, our craving 
for certainty161 may cause us to search for the immutable. This is 
155. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54. 
156. See supra note 75 & accompanying text. 
157. See supra note 27. 
158. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, Tlte "Right" to Vote, and 
the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 33. 
159. One reason that literal and historical approaches tend to be conjoined, see 
supra note 50, is that the meaning of words cb,mges over time. Without the historical 
supplement, most literal approaches would be far less concrete than the literalist usu-
ally desires. Although I cannot explore the issue fully here, I am inclined to argue 
that language change is one of the conventions accepted by a user of language, espe-
cially one who puts language into an authoritative text. This argument touches more 
deeply on the very nature of law than is appropriate here. 
160. "Historically oriented critics seem curiously reluctant to follow the lead of 
most historians, who expect to reinterpret the past and its works for each generation." 
P. JoNES, supra note 57, at 185. See generally Passmore, Tlte Objectivity of History, in· 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 145 (P. Gardiner ed. 1974). . 
161. "[C]ertainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of mankind." 
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most apparent in law, where the myth of certainty has a persistent 
appeal. 162 But the law cannot be certain, in large part because 
language itself is not certain. What is unfortunate is that quixotic 
quests for certainty are likely to interfere with more fruitful quests 
for an intelligent understanding of the causes and management of 
our uncertainty. 
Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,466 (1897). See also J. FRANK, LAW 
AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). 
162. J. FRANK, supra note 161. 
